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ABSTRACT. The science of complexity is based on a new way of thinking that 
stands in sharp contrast to the philosophy underlying Newtonian science, which is 
based on reductionism, determinism, and objective knowledge. This paper reviews 
the historical development of this new world view, focusing on its philosophical 
foundations. Determinism was challenged by quantum mechanics and chaos theory. 
Systems theory replaced reductionism by a scientifically based holism. Cybernetics 
and postmodern social science showed that knowledge is intrinsically subjective. 
These developments are being integrated under the header of “complexity science”. 
Its central paradigm is the multi-agent system. Agents are intrinsically subjective 
and uncertain about their environment and future, but out of their local interactions, 
a global organization emerges. Although different philosophers, and in particular the 
postmodernists, have voiced similar ideas, the paradigm of complexity still needs to 
be fully assimilated by philosophy. This will throw a new light on old philosophical 
issues such as relativism, ethics and the role of the subject. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Complexity is perhaps the most essential characteristic of our present society. As 
technological and economic advances make production, transport and communication 
ever more efficient, we interact with ever more people, organizations, systems and 
objects. And as this network of interactions grows and spreads around the globe, the 
different economic, social, technological and ecological systems that we are part of 
become ever more interdependent. The result is an ever more complex "system of 
systems" where a change in any component may affect virtually any other component, 
and that in a mostly unpredictable manner.  
 The traditional scientific method, which is based on analysis, isolation, and the 
gathering of complete information about a phenomenon, is incapable to deal with such 
complex interdependencies. The emerging science of complexity (Waldrop, 1992; 
Cilliers, 1998; Heylighen, 1997) offers the promise of an alternative methodology that 
would be able tackle such problems. However, such an approach needs solid 
foundations, that is, a clear understanding and definition of the underlying concepts and 
principles (Heylighen, 2000).  
 Such a conceptual framework is still sorely lacking. In practice, applications of 
complexity science use either very specialized, technical formalisms, such as network 
clustering algorithms, computer simulations and non-linear differential equations, or 
rather vaguely defined ideas and metaphors, such as emergence and “the edge of 
chaos”. As such, complexity science is little more than an amalgam of methods, models 
and metaphors from a variety of disciplines rather than an integrated science. Yet, 
insofar that complexity science can claim a unified focus, it is to be found precisely in 
its way of thinking, which is intrinsically different from the one of traditional science 
(Gershenson & Heylighen, 2005). 
 A basic function of philosophy is to analyse and criticise the implicit assumptions 
behind our thinking, whether it is based in science, culture or common sense. As such, 
philosophy can help us to clarify the principles of thought that characterise complexity 
science and that distinguish it from its predecessors. Vice versa, complexity theory can 
help philosophy solve some of its perennial problems, such as the origins of mind, 
organization or ethics. Traditionally, philosophy is subdivided into metaphysics and 
ontology—which examines the fundamental categories of reality, logic and 
epistemology—which investigates how we can know and reason about that reality, 
aesthetics and ethics.  
 Aesthetics and ethics link into the questions of value and meaning, which are 
usually considered to be outside the scope of science. The present essay will therefore 
start by focusing on the subjects that are traditionally covered by philosophy of science, 
i.e. the ontology and epistemology underlying subsequent scientific approaches. We 
will present these in an approximately historical order, starting with the most “classical” 
of approaches, Newtonian science, and then moving via the successive criticisms of this 
approach in systems science and cybernetics, to the emerging synthesis that is 
complexity science. We will then summarise the impact these notions have had in social 
science and especially (postmodern) philosophy, thus coming back to ethics and other 
issues traditionally ignored by (hard) science. 
 
 
Newtonian science 
Until the early 20th century, classical mechanics, as first formulated by Newton and 
further developed by Laplace and others, was seen as the foundation for science as a 
whole. It was expected that the observations made by other sciences would sooner or 
later be reduced to the laws of mechanics. Although that never happened, other 
disciplines, such as biology, psychology or economics, did adopt a general mechanistic 
or Newtonian methodology and world view. This influence was so great, that most 
people with a basic notion of science still implicitly equate “scientific thinking” with 
“Newtonian thinking”. The reason for this pervasive influence is that the mechanistic 
paradigm is compelling by its simplicity, coherence and apparent completeness. 
Moreover, it was not only very successful in its scientific applications, but largely in 
agreement with intuition and common-sense. Later theories of mechanics, such as 
relativity theory and quantum mechanics, while at least as successful in the realm of 
applications, lacked this simplicity and intuitive appeal, and are still plagued by 
paradoxes, confusions and multiple interpretations. 
 The logic behind Newtonian science is easy to formulate, although its implications 
are subtle. Its best known principle, which was formulated by the philosopher-scientist 
Descartes well before Newton, is that of analysis or reductionism: to understand any 
complex phenomenon, you need to take it apart, i.e. reduce it to its individual 
components. If these are still complex, you need to take your analysis one step further, 
and look at their components.  
 If you continue this subdivision long enough, you will end up with the smallest 
possible parts, the atoms (in the original meaning of “indivisibles”), or what we would 
now call “elementary particles”. Particles can be seen as separate pieces of the same 
hard, permanent substance that is called matter. Newtonian ontology therefore is 
materialistic: it assumes that all phenomena, whether physical, biological, mental or 
social, are ultimately constituted of matter. 
 The only property that fundamentally distinguishes particles is their position in 
space (which may include dimensions other than the conventional three). Apparently 
different substances, systems or phenomena are merely different arrangements in space 
of fundamentally equivalent pieces of matter. Any change, development or evolution is 
therefore merely a geometrical rearrangement caused by the movement of the 
components. This movement is governed by deterministic laws of cause and effect. If 
you know the initial positions and velocities of the particles constituting a system 
together with the forces acting on those particles (which are themselves determined by 
the positions of these and other particles), then you can in principle predict the further 
evolution of the system with complete certainty and accuracy. The trajectory of the 
system is not only determined towards the future, but towards the past: given its present 
state, you can in principle reverse the evolution to reconstruct any earlier state it has 
gone through.  
 The elements of the Newtonian ontology are matter, the absolute space and time in 
which that matter moves, and the forces or natural laws that govern movement. No 
other fundamental categories of being, such as mind, life, organization or purpose, are 
acknowledged. They are at most to be seen as epiphenomena, as particular 
arrangements of particles in space and time.  
 Newtonian epistemology is based on the reflection-correspondence view of 
knowledge (Turchin, 1990): our knowledge is merely an (imperfect) reflection of the 
particular arrangements of matter outside of us. The task of science is to make the 
mapping or correspondence between the external, material objects and the internal, 
cognitive elements (concepts or symbols) that represent them as accurate as possible. 
That can be achieved by simple observation, where information about external 
phenomena is collected and registered, thus further completing the internal picture that 
is taking shape. In the limit, this should lead to a perfect, objective representation of the 
world outside us, which would allow us to accurately predict all phenomena. 
 All these different assumptions can summarized by the principle of distinction 
conservation (Heylighen, 1990): classical science begins by making as precise as 
possible distinctions between the different components, properties and states of the 
system under observation. These distinctions are assumed to be absolute and objective, 
i.e. the same for all observers. The evolution of the system conserves all these 
distinctions, as distinct initial states are necessarily mapped onto distinct subsequent 
states, and vice-versa (this is equivalent to the principle of causality (Heylighen, 1989)). 
In particular, distinct entities (particles) remain distinct: there is no way for particles to 
merge, divide, appear or disappear. In other words, in the Newtonian world view there 
is no place for novelty or creation (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984): everything that exists 
now has existed from the beginning of time and will continue to exist, albeit in a 
somewhat different configuration. Knowledge is nothing more than another such 
distinction-conserving mapping from object to subject: scientific discovery is not a 
creative process, it is merely an “uncovering” of distinctions that were waiting to be 
observed. 
 In essence, the philosophy of Newtonian science is one of simplicity: the 
complexity of the world is only apparent; to deal with it you need to analyse 
phenomena into their simplest components. Once you have done that, their evolution 
will turn out to be perfectly regular, reversible and predictable, while the knowledge 
you gained will merely be a reflection of that pre-existing order. 
 
Rationality and modernity 
Up to this point, Newtonian logic is perfectly consistent—albeit simplistic in retrospect. 
But if we moreover want to include human agency, we come to a basic contradiction 
between our intuitive notion of free will and the principle of determinism. The only way 
Newtonian reasoning can be extended to encompass the idea that people can act 
purposefully is by postulating the independent category of mind. This reasoning led 
Descartes to propose the philosophy of dualism, which assumes that while material 
objects obey mechanical laws, the mind does not. However, while we can easily 
conceive the mind as a passive receptacle registering observations in order to develop 
ever more complete knowledge, we cannot explain how the mind can freely act upon 
those systems without contradicting the determinism of natural law. This explains why 
classical science ignores all issues of ethics or values: there simply is no place for 
purposeful action in the Newtonian world view.  
 At best, economic science has managed to avoid the problem by postulating the 
principle of rational choice, which assumes that an agent will always choose the option 
that maximises its utility. Utility is supposed to be an objective measure of the degree of 
value, "happiness" or "goodness" produced by a state of affairs. Assuming perfect 
information about the utility of the possible options, the actions of mind then become as 
determined or predictable as the movements of matter. This allowed social scientists to 
describe human agency with most of the Newtonian principles intact. Moreover, it led 
them to a notion of linear progress: the continuous increase in global utility (seen 
mostly as quantifiable, material welfare) made possible by increases in scientific 
knowledge. Although such directed change towards the greater good contradicts the 
Newtonian assumption of reversibility, it maintains the basic assumptions of 
determinism, materialism and objective knowledge, thus defining what is often called 
the project of modernity. 
 The assumptions of determinism and of objective, observer-independent 
knowledge have been challenged soon after classic mechanics reached its apex, by its 
successor theories within physics: quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and non-linear 
dynamics (chaos theory). This has produced more than half a century of philosophical 
debate, resulting in the conclusion that our scientific knowledge of the world is 
fundamentally uncertain (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997). While the notion of uncertainty 
or indeterminacy is an essential aspect of the newly emerging world view centring 
around complexity (Gershenson & Heylighen, 2005; Cilliers, 1998), it is in itself not 
complex, and the physical theories that introduced it are still in essence reductionist. 
We will therefore leave this aspect aside for the time being, and focus on complexity 
itself. 
  
  
Systems science 
Holism and emergence 
The first challenges to reductionism and its denial of creative change appeared in the 
beginning of the twentieth century in the work of process philosophers, such as 
Bergson, Teilhard, Whitehead, and in particular Smuts (1926), who coined the word 
holism which he defined as the tendency of a whole to be greater than the sum of its 
parts. This raises the question what precisely it is that the whole has more.  
 In present terminology, we would say that a whole has emergent properties, i.e. 
properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the parts. For example, kitchen 
salt (NaCl) is edible, forms crystals and has a salty taste. These properties are 
completely different from the properties of its chemical components, sodium (Na) 
which is a violently reactive, soft metal, and chlorine (Cl), which is a poisonous gas. 
Similarly, a musical piece has the properties of rhythm, melody and harmony, which are 
absent in the individual notes that constitute the piece. A car has the property of being 
able to drive. Its individual components, such as motor, steering wheel, tires or frame, 
lack this property. On the other hand, the car has a weight, which is merely the sum of 
the weights of its components. Thus, when checking the list of properties of the car you 
are considering to buy, you may note that “maximum speed” is an emergent property, 
while “weight” is not.  
 In fact, on closer scrutiny practically all of the properties that matter to us in 
everyday-life, such as beauty, life, status, intelligence..., turn out to be emergent. 
Therefore, it is surprising that science has ignored emergence and holism for so long. 
One reason is that the Newtonian approach was so successful compared to its non-
scientific predecessors that it seemed that its strategy of reductionism would sooner or 
later overcome all remaining obstacles. Another reason is that the alternative, holism or 
emergentism, seemed to lack any serious scientific foundation, referring more to 
mystical traditions than to mathematical or experimental methods. 
 
General Systems Theory 
This changed with the formulation of systems theory by Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
(1973). The biologist von Bertalanffy was well-versed in the mathematical models used 
to describe physical systems, but noted that living systems, unlike their mechanical 
counterparts studied by Newtonian science, are intrinsically open: they have to interact 
with their environment, absorbing and releasing matter and energy in order to stay 
alive. One reason Newtonian models were so successful in predicting was because they 
only considered systems, such as the planetary system, that are essentially closed. Open 
systems, on the other hand, depend on an environment much larger and more complex 
than the system itself, so that its effect can never be truly controlled or predicted. 
 The idea of open system immediately suggests a number of fundamental concepts 
that help us to give holism a more precise foundation. First, each system has an 
environment, from which it is separated by a boundary. This boundary gives the system 
its own identity, separating it from other systems. Matter, energy and information are 
exchanged across that boundary. Incoming streams determine the system’s input, 
outgoing streams its output. This provides us with a simple way to connect or couple 
different systems: it suffices that the output of one system be used as input by another 
system. A group of systems coupled via different input-output relations forms a 
network. If this network functions in a sufficiently coherent manner, we will consider it 
as a system in its own right, a supersystem, that contains the initial systems as its 
subsystems.  
 From the point of view of the new system, a subsystem or component should be 
seen not as an independent element, but as a particular type of relation mapping input 
onto output. This transformation or processing can be seen as the function that this 
subsystem performs within the larger whole. Its internal structure or substance can be 
considered wholly irrelevant to the way it performs that function. For example, the 
same information processing function may be performed by neurons in the brain, 
transistors on a chip, or software modules in a simulation. This is the view of a system 
as a “black box” whose content we do not know—and do not need to know. This entails 
an ontology completely different from the Newtonian one: the building blocks of reality 
are not material particles, but abstract relations, and the complex organizations that 
together they form. In that sense, systems ontology is reminiscent of the relational 
philosophy of Leibniz, who had a famous debate with Newton about the assumptions 
behind the mechanistic world view, but who never managed to develop his 
philosophical alternative into a workable scientific theory. 
 By making abstraction of the concrete substance of components, systems theory 
can establish isomorphisms between systems of different types, noting that the network 
of relations that defines them are the same at some abstract level, even though the 
systems at first sight belong to completely different domains. For example, a society is 
in a number of respects similar to a living organism, and a computer to a brain. This 
allowed von Bertalanffy to call for a General Systems Theory, i.e. a way of 
investigating systems independently of their specific subject domain. Like Newtonian 
science, systems science strives towards a unification of all the scientific disciplines—
from physics to biology, psychology and sociology—but by investigating the patterns 
of organization that are common to different phenomena rather than their common 
material components. 
 Every system contains subsystems, while being contained in one or more 
supersystems. Thus, it forms part of a hierarchy which extends upwards towards ever 
larger wholes, and downwards towards ever smaller parts (de Rosnay, 1979). For 
example, a human individual belongs to the supersystem “society” while having 
different organs and physiological circuits as its subsystems. Systems theory considers 
both directions, the downward direction of reduction or analysis, and the upward 
direction of holism or emergence, as equally important for understanding the true nature 
of the system. It does not deny the utility of the analytical method, but complements it 
by adding the integrative method, which considers the system in the broader context of 
its relations with other systems together with which it forms a supersystem.  
 Also the concept of emergent property receives a more solid definition via the 
ideas of constraint and downward causation. Systems that through their coupling form 
a supersystem are constrained: they can no longer act as if they are independent from 
the others; the supersystem imposes a certain coherence or coordination on its 
components. This means that not only is the behavior of the whole determined by the 
properties of its parts (“upwards causation”), but the behavior of the parts is to some 
degree constrained by the properties of the whole (“downward causation” (Campbell, 
1974)). For example, the behavior of an individual is controlled not only by the 
neurophysiology of her brain, but by the rules of the society to which she belongs.  
 Because of the dependencies between components, the properties of these 
components can no longer vary independently: they have to obey certain relationships. 
This makes much of the individual properties irrelevant, while shifting the focus to the 
state of their relationship, which will now define a new type of “emergent” property. 
For example, a sodium atom that gets bonded to a chlorine atom, forming a salt 
molecule, loses its ability to react with other atoms, such as oxygen, but acquires the 
ability to align itself into a crystalline structure with other salt molecules. 
  
Cybernetics and the subjectivity of knowledge 
Tight relationships between subsystems turn the whole into a coherent organization 
with its own identity and autonomy. Cybernetics, an approach closely associated to 
systems theory, has shown how this autonomy can be maintained through goal-directed, 
apparently intelligent action (Ashby, 1964; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001). The principle is 
simple: certain types of circular coupling between systems can give rise to a negative 
feedback loop, which suppresses deviations from an equilibrium state. This means that 
the system will actively compensate perturbations originating in its environment in 
order to maintain or reach its "preferred" state of affairs. The greater the variety of 
perturbations the system has to cope with, the greater the variety of compensating 
actions it should be able to perform (Ashby’s (1964) law of requisite variety), and the 
greater the knowledge or intelligence the system will need in order to know which 
action to perform in which circumstances. Research in cybernetics—and later in neural 
networks, artificial intelligence and cognitive science—has shown how such 
intelligence can be realized through an adaptive network of relations transforming 
sensory input into decisions about actions (output). Thus, the systems perspective has 
done away with the Cartesian split between mind and matter: both are merely particular 
types of relations. 
 However, this perspective entails a new view on epistemology. According to 
cybernetics, knowledge is intrinsically subjective; it is merely an imperfect tool used by 
an intelligent agent to help it achieve its personal goals (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001; 
Maturana & Varela, 1992). Such an agent not only does not need an objective reflection 
of reality, it can never achieve one. Indeed, the agent does not have access to any 
“external reality”: it can merely sense its inputs, note its outputs (actions) and from the 
correlations between them induce certain rules or regularities that seem to hold within 
its environment. Different agents, experiencing different inputs and outputs, will in 
general induce different correlations, and therefore develop a different knowledge of the 
environment in which they live. There is no objective way to determine whose view is 
right and whose is wrong, since the agents effectively live in different environments 
("Umwelts")—although they may find that some of the regularities they infer appear to 
be similar. 
 This insight led to a new movement within the cybernetics and systems tradition 
that calls itself “second-order cybernetics” (von Foerster, 1979; Heylighen & Joslyn, 
2001). Its main thesis is that we, as observers, are also cybernetic systems. This means 
that our knowledge is a subjective construction, not an objective reflection of reality. 
Therefore, the emphasis has to shift from the apparently objective systems around us to 
the cognitive and social processes by which we construct our subjective models of those 
systems. This constitutes a major break with traditional systems theory, which 
implicitly assumed that there is an objective structure or organization in the systems we 
investigate (Bunge, 1979). This departure was reinforced by the concepts of autonomy, 
autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1979) and self-organization, that were introduced to 
characterise natural, living systems in contrast to artificial, engineered systems. These 
imply that the structure of a system is not given, but developed by the system itself, as a 
means to survive and adapt to a complex and changing environment.  
 The rift became even larger when it became clear that many systems, and in 
particular social systems, do not have any clear structure, function or organization, but 
consist of a tangle of partly competing, partly co-operating, or simply mutually ignoring 
subsystems. For example, whereas the older generation of systems thinkers (e.g. 
Parsons, 1991) viewed society as a stable, organism-like system, where the different 
subsystems have clearly defined functions in contributing to the common good, the 
newer generation of social scientists saw an anarchy of conflicting forces with different 
coalitions and subcultures emerging and disappearing again. In such systems, there are 
many relationships which cut across apparently hierarchical layers so that a system that 
is subordinate to another system in one respect, appears superordinate in another 
respect, an ill-defined configuration that is sometimes called "heterarchy". 
 The growing awareness of these two limitations to the systems view—the 
subjectivity of knowledge and the lack of order in autonomous and especially social 
systems—promoted the emergence of a new science of complex systems in parallel 
with a "Postmodern" philosophy (Cilliers, 1998).  
 
 
Complexity Science 
In the 1980’s, a new approach emerged which is usually labelled as complex adaptive 
systems (Holland, 1996) or, more generally, complexity science (Waldrop, 1992). 
Although its origins are largely independent from systems science and cybernetics, 
complexity science offers the promise to extend and integrate their ideas, and thus 
develop a radical, yet workable alternative to the Newtonian paradigm. The roots of the 
complexity movement are diverse, including:  
• non-linear dynamics and statistical mechanics—two offshoots from Newtonian 
mechanics—which noted that the modelling of more complex systems required 
new mathematical tools that can deal with randomness and chaos; 
• computer science, which allowed the simulation of systems too large or too 
complex to model mathematically; 
• biological evolution, which explains the appearances of complex forms through the 
intrinsically unpredictable mechanism of blind variation and natural selection; 
• the application of these methods to describe social systems in the broad sense, such 
as stock markets, the Internet or insect societies, where there is no predefined order, 
although there are emergent structures.  
 
Given these scientific backgrounds, most complexity researchers have not yet reflected 
about the philosophical foundations of their approach—unlike the systems and 
cybernetics researchers. As such, many still implicitly cling to the Newtonian paradigm, 
hoping to discover mathematically formulated “laws of complexity” that would restore 
some form of absolute order or determinism to the very uncertain world they are trying 
to understand. However, we believe that once the insights from systems science and 
postmodern philosophy will have been fully digested, a philosophy of complexity will 
emerge that is truly novel, and whose outline we can at present only vaguely discern. 
 What distinguishes complexity science is its focus on phenomena that are 
characterized neither by order—like those studied in Newtonian mechanics and systems 
science, nor by disorder—like those investigated by statistical mechanics and 
Postmodern social science, but that are situated somewhere in between, in the zone that 
is commonly (though perhaps misleadingly) called the edge of chaos (Langton, 1990). 
Ordered systems, such as a crystal, are characterized by the fact that their components 
obey strict rules or constraints that specify how each component depends on the others. 
Disordered systems, such as a gas, consist of components that are independent, acting 
without any constraint. Order is simple to model, since we can predict everything once 
we know the initial conditions and the constraints. Disorder too is simple in a sense: 
while we cannot predict the behavior of individual components, statistical independence 
means that we can accurately predict their average behavior, which for large numbers 
of components is practically equal to their overall behavior. In a truly complex system, 
on the other hand, components are to some degree independent, and thus autonomous in 
their behavior, while undergoing various direct and indirect interactions. This makes the 
global behavior of the system very difficult to predict, although it is not random.  
 
Multi-agent systems 
This brings us to the most important conceptual tool introduced by complexity science: 
the complex adaptive system, as defined by Holland (1996), which is presently more 
commonly denoted as a multi-agent system. The basic components of a complex 
adaptive system are called agents. They are typically conceived as “black box” systems, 
meaning that we know the rules that govern their individual behavior, but we do not 
care about their internal structure. The rules they follow can be very simple or relatively 
complex; they can be deterministic or probabilistic. Intuitively, agents can be conceived 
as autonomous individuals who try to achieve some personal goal or value (“utility” or 
“fitness”) by acting upon their environment—which includes other agents. But an agent 
does not need to exhibit intelligence or any specifically “mental” quality, since agents 
can represent systems as diverse as people, ants, cells or molecules. In that respect, 
complexity science has assimilated the lessons from cybernetics, refusing to draw any a 
priori boundary between mind and matter.  
 From evolutionary theory, complexity science has learned that agents typically are 
ignorant about their wider environment or the long-term effects of their actions: they 
reach their goals basically by trial-and-error, which is equivalent to blind variation 
followed by the natural selection of the agents, actions or rules for action that best 
achieve fitness. Another way to describe this short-sightedness is by noting that agents 
are intrinsically egocentric or selfish: they only care about their own goal or fitness, 
initially ignoring other agents. Only at a later stage may they “get to know” their 
neighbours well enough to develop some form of cooperation (e.g. Axelrod, 1984). But 
even when the agents are intelligent and knowledgeable enough to select apparently 
rational or cooperative actions, they—like us—are intrinsically uncertain about the 
remote effects of their actions.  
 This limited range of rational anticipation is reflected at the deepest level by the 
principle of locality: agents only interact with (and thus get the chance to “know”) a 
small number of other agents which form their local neighbourhood. Yet, in the longer 
term these local actions typically have global consequences, affecting the complex 
system as a whole. Such global effects are by definition unexpected at the agent level, 
and in that sense emergent: they could not have been inferred from the local rules 
(properties) that determine the agents’ behavior. For us as outside observers, such 
emergent properties do not necessarily come as a surprise: if the interactions between 
the agents are sufficiently regular or homogeneous, as in the interactions between 
molecules in a crystal or a gas, we may be able to predict the resulting global 
configuration. But in the more general cases, it is impossible to extrapolate from the 
local to the global level.  
 This may be better understood through the following observations. First, agents’ 
goals are intrinsically independent, and therefore often in conflict: the action that seems 
to most directly lead to A’s goal, may hinder B in achieving its goal, and will therefore 
be actively resisted by B. This is most obvious in economies and ecosystems, where 
individuals and organisms are always to some degree competing for resources. Eating a 
zebra may be an obvious solution to the lion’s problem of hunger, but that action will 
be resisted by the zebra. Increasing the price may be the most obvious way for a 
producer to increase profit, but that will be resisted by the clients switching to other 
suppliers. Such inherent conflicts imply that there is no “global optimum” for the 
system to settle in, i.e. an equilibrium state that maximally satisfies all agents’ goals. 
Instead, agents will co-evolve: they constantly adapt to the changes made by other 
agents, but through this modify the others’ environment, thus forcing them to adapt as 
well (cf. Kauffman, 1995). This results in an on-going process of mutual adaptation, 
which in biology is elegantly expressed by metaphors such as an “arms race” or the 
“Red Queen principle”.  
 Second, since actions are local, their effects can only propagate step by step to 
more remote agents, thus diffusing across the whole network formed by the agents and 
their relationships of interaction. The same action will in general have multiple effects 
in different parts of the network at different times. Some of those causal chains will 
close in on themselves, feeding back into the conditions that started the chain. This 
makes the system intrinsically non-linear. This means that there is no proportionality 
between cause and effect. On the one hand, small fluctuations may be amplified to 
large, global effects by positive feedback or “autocatalysis”. Such sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions, which is often referred to as the “butterfly effect”, is one of the 
hallmarks of deterministic chaos, i.e. globally unpredictable changes produced by 
locally deterministic processes. But complex systems don’t need to be deterministic to 
behave chaotically. On the other hand, feedback can also be negative, so that large 
perturbations are suppressed, possibly resulting in the stabilisation of a global 
configuration. 
 
Creative evolution 
The combination of these different effects leads to a global evolution that is not only 
unpredictable, but truly creative, producing emergent organization and innovative 
solutions to global and local problems. When we focus on the complex system in itself, 
we can call the process self-organization: the system spontaneously arranges its 
components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to 
maximize overall fitness, without need for an external or internal designer or controller 
(Heylighen, 2002; Kauffman, 1995). When we focus on the relation between the system 
and the environment, we may call it adaptation (Holland, 1996): whatever the pressures 
imposed by the environment, the system will adjust its structure in order to cope with 
them. Of course, there is no guarantee of success: given the intrinsic sensitivity and 
unpredictability of the system, failures and catastrophes can (and do) happen, often 
when we do not expect them. But in the long term, on-going self-organization and 
adaptation appear to be the rule rather than the exception. 
 As such, the complexity paradigm answers a fundamental philosophical question 
that was left open by earlier approaches: what is the origin of the order, organization 
and apparent intelligence that we see around us (Heylighen, 2000)? Newtonian and 
systems science had eluded that question by considering that order as pre-existing. 
Earlier, pre-scientific philosophies had tackled the question by postulating a 
supernatural Creator. Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection had 
provided a partial answer, which moreover remained restricted to biological systems, 
and thus is considered unsatisfactory by many. The co-evolution of many, interacting 
agents, on the other hand, seems able to explain the emergence of organization in any 
domain or context: physical, chemical, biological, psychological or social.  
 While it is difficult to imagine the limitless ramifications of such a process without 
the support of complex computer simulations or mathematical models, the basic 
principle is simple: each agent through trial-and-error tries to achieve a situation that 
maximises its fitness within the environment. However, because the agent cannot 
foresee all the consequences, actions will generally collide with the actions of other 
agents, thus reaping a less than optimal result. This pressures the agent to try out 
different action patterns, until one is found that reduces the friction with neighbouring 
agents’ activities, and increases their synergy. This creates a small, relatively stable 
“community” of mutually adapted agents within the larger collective. Neighbouring 
agents too will try to adapt to the regime of activity within the community so that the 
community grows. The larger it becomes, the stronger its influence or “selective 
pressure” on the remaining agents, so that eventually the whole collective will be 
assimilated into the new, organized regime. Whenever the organization encounters a 
problem (loss of fitness), whether because of internal tensions or because of 
perturbations from the outside, a new adaptation process will be triggered in the place 
where the problem is experienced, propagating as far as necessary to absorb all the 
negative effects. 
 In such an organized collective, individual agents or agent communities will 
typically specialise in a particular activity (e.g. processing a particular type of resource) 
that complements the activities of the other agents. As such, agents or communities can 
be seen to fulfil a certain function or role within the global system, acting like 
functional subsystems. Thus, complex adaptive systems may come to resemble the 
supersystems studied by systems theory. Such a supersystem can be seen as an agent at 
a higher level, and the interaction of several such “superagents” may recursively 
produce systems at an ever higher hierarchical level (Heylighen, 2002). 
 However, the organization of such a complex system is not frozen, but flexible, 
and the same agent may now seem to participate in one function, then in another. In 
some cases, like in multicellular organisms, the functional differentiation appears pretty 
stable. In others, like in our present society or in the brain, agents regularly switch roles. 
But the difference is merely one of degree, as all complex systems created through self-
organization and evolution are intrinsically adaptive, since they cannot rely on a fixed 
plan or blueprint to tell them how they should behave. This makes a naturally evolved 
organization, such as the brain, much more robust than an organization that has been 
consciously designed, such as a computer. The intrinsic uncertainty, which appeared 
like a weakness, actually turns out to be a strength, since it forces the system to have 
sufficient reserves or redundancy and to constantly try out new things so as to be 
prepared for any eventuality. 
   
 
Complexity and (Postmodern) Philosophy 
Although ideas from complexity theory have had a substantial impact on various 
disciplines outside the "hard" sciences from where they originated, in particular in 
sociology (e.g. Urry, 2003, Byrne, 1998) and organisational sciences (e.g. Stacey et al 
2000, Stacey, 2001, Richardson, 2005), the impact on mainstream philosophy has not 
been as significant as one would expect. This is surprising given that the related 
domains of cognitive science and evolutionary theory have inspired plenty of 
philosophical investigations.  
 One reason may be that the Anglo-Saxon tradition of "analytic" philosophy by its 
very focus on analysing problems into their logical components is inimical to the 
holism, uncertainty and subjectivity entailed by complexity. Within the English-
speaking academic world, we only know two philosophers who have founded their 
ontology on the holistic notion of system: Bunge (1979), who otherwise remains a 
believer in objective, logical knowledge, and Bahm (1987), who continues the more 
mystical tradition of process philosophy. The few philosophers, such as Morin (1992), 
Luhmann (1995) and Stengers (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; 1997), who have directly 
addressed complexity, including the uncertainty and subjectivity that it entails, all seem 
to come from the continental tradition.  
 Another reason may be that much of complexity theory has resulted from 
developments in mathematics and computational theory. This is not the normal domain 
of most philosophers. Complexity has therefore been mostly discussed in philosophy of 
science, mathematics and computation, but not really in philosophy of culture and 
social philosophy. To the extent that it has, the discussion either ignored a lot of already 
established work on complexity (e.g. Rescher, 1998), or made use of ideas derived 
mainly from chaos theory, something we regard as a very limited subset of complexity 
studies in general (e.g. Taylor, 2003). (A number of insightful and stimulating papers, 
focusing to a large extent on the work of Luhmann, can be found in Observing 
Complexity, edited by Rasch and Wolfe (2000). The paper by Rasch himself, entitled 
Immanent Systems, Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of Ethics is of 
particular interest.) 
 A further reason may be that philosophy has somehow always been engaged with 
complex issues, even if it has not been done in the language used by contemporary 
complexity theorists. If this is true, the language of complexity could fruitfully inform a 
number of philosophical debates and, vice versa, ideas from philosophy of language, 
culture and society could enrich discussions on complexity as such. To an extent this 
interaction is taking place in that part of philosophy sometimes characterised as 
“postmodern”. (Note that this term should be used with caution. It can refer to a very 
wide range of positions, sometimes pejoratively and sometimes merely as a verbalism. 
It will not be used here to refer to flabby or relativist positions, but to a number of solid 
philosophical positions critical of foundational forms of modernism.) 
 The general sensitivity to complexity in philosophy can be traced in an interesting 
way by looking at positions incorporating a systems perspective. A good starting point 
would be Hegel. The dialectical process whereby knowledge, and the relationship 
between knowledge and the world, develops, works, for Hegel, in a systemic way. A 
new synthesis incorporates the differences of the thesis and the antithesis, but it already 
poses as a new thesis to be confronted. Thus Hegel’s system is an historical entity, 
something with a procedural nature. The problem is that, for Hegel, this is a converging 
process, ultimately culminating in what Cornell (1992) calls a “totalising system”. His 
position thus remains fully within the modernist paradigm. 
 Several philosophical positions incorporate important insights from Hegel, but 
resist this idea of convergence. A good example is Adorno’s negative dialectics, where 
the dialectical process drives a diverging process (see Held, 1980). More influential 
examples, in terms of the complexity debate at least, are the systems theories of Freud 
(1950) and Saussure (1974). In his early Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud 
develops a model of the brain based on a system of differences which is structurally 
equivalent to Saussure’s model of language. In this understanding, signs in a system do 
not have meaning on their own, but through the relationships amongst all the signs in 
the system. The work of Freud and Saussure, especially in the way it has been 
transformed and elaborated by thinkers like Derrida and Lacan, has been central to 
much of postmodern philosophy, as discussed by Cilliers (1998: 37-47). 
 Modernism can be characterised, in Lyotard’s words (1988: xxiv), as a search for a 
single coherent meta-narrative, i.e. to find the language of the world, the one way in 
which to describe it correctly and completely. This can only be a reductive strategy, 
something which reduces the complexity and the diversity of the world to a finite 
number of essential features. If the central argument of postmodernism is a rejection of 
this dream of modernism, then postmodernism can be characterised in general as a way 
of thinking which is sensitive to the complexity of the world. Although he does not 
make use of complexity theory as such, Derrida is sensitive to exactly this argument. “If 
things were simple, word would have gotten around” he famously says in the Afterword 
to Limited Inc (Derrida, 1988: 119). Lyotard’s (1988) characterisation of different 
forms of knowledge, and his insistence on what he calls “paralogy”, as opposed to 
conventional logic, is similarly an acknowledgement of the complexity of the 
postmodern world (see Cilliers, 1998, p.112-140, for a detailed discussion of Lyotard's 
position from within a complexity perspective). An innate sensitivity to complexity is 
also central to the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987; Guattari, 1995). Many of their 
post-Freudian insights, and especially the idea of the “rhizome” deny reductive 
strategies. Their work has also been interpreted specifically from a complexity 
perspective (DeLanda, 2005; Ansell-Pearson, 1999). 
 As yet, applications of complexity theory to the social sciences have not been very 
productive. There may be a number of reasons for this, but it can be argued that many 
social theorists were introduced to complexity via the work done by “hard” complexity 
scientists, perhaps mostly through the work of what one can broadly call the Santa Fe 
school (Waldrop, 1992). Since this work is strongly informed by chaos theory, it 
contains strong reductive elements, and in that sense it is still very much “modernist” in 
flavour. The “postmodern” approach, especially one informed by recent developments 
in general complexity theory, could be extremely useful in enriching the discourse on 
social and cultural complexity. There are, without any doubt, a number of postmodern 
positions which are just too flaky to take seriously, but the all too common knee-jerk 
rejection of anything labelled “postmodern” —irrespective of whether this label is used 
correctly or not—will have to be tempered in order to get this discourse going. Space 
does not allow a detailed discussion of the different themes which could form part of 
this discourse, but a few can be mentioned briefly. 
 
The Structure of Complex Systems 
The emphasis on ideas from chaos theory has negatively influenced our understanding 
of the structure of complex systems. Most natural complex systems have a well-defined 
structure and they are usually quite robust. Despite their non-linear nature, they are not 
perpetually balanced on a knife’s edge. Theories of meaning derived from a post-
structural understanding of language, e.g. deconstruction, could illuminate this debate. 
In order for this illumination to take place, it will first have to be acknowledged that 
deconstruction does not imply that meaning is relative. (See Cilliers, 2005.) 
 
Boundaries and Limits 
The relationship between a complex system and its environment or context is in itself a 
complex problem. When dealing with social systems, it is often unclear where the 
boundary of a system is. It is often a matter of theoretical choice. Furthermore, the 
notion “limit” is often confused with the notion “boundary”, especially where the 
theory of autopoiesis is used. The problems of “framing” and the way in which context 
and system mutually constitute each other could be elaborated on from several 
postmodern viewpoints. (See Cilliers, 2001.) 
 
The Problem of Difference 
For the modernist, difference and diversity was always a problem to be solved. For the 
postmodernist, diversity is not a problem, but the most important resource of a complex 
system. Important discussions on diversity and difference, including issues in multi-
culturalism, globalisation, bio-diversity, sustainability and the nature of social systems 
in general, could benefit greatly from the work done on difference by Saussure, Derrida, 
Deleuze and other post-structural thinkers. 
 
The Idea of the Subject 
The Enlightenment idea of a self-contained, atomistic subject is undermined in similar 
ways by complexity theories and postmodernism. Nevertheless, the idea of the subject 
cannot be dismissed. Notions of agency and responsibility remain extremely important, 
but they have to be supplemented with insights from theories of self-organisation and 
social construction. There are many unresolved problems in this area and some very 
exciting work could be done here. For a very preliminary attempt, see Cilliers and De 
Villiers (2000). 
 
Complexity and Ethics 
Moral philosophy has been strongly influenced by the modernist ideal of getting it 
exactly right. Complexity theory argues that, since we cannot give a complete 
description of a complex system, we also cannot devise an unchanging and non-
provisional set of rules to control the behaviour of that system. Complexity theory (and 
postmodernism), of course, cannot devise a better ethical system, or at least not a 
system that will solve the problem. What it can do however, is to show that when we 
deal with complexity—and in the social and human domain we always do—we cannot 
escape the moment of choice, and thus we are never free of normative considerations. 
Whatever we do has ethical implications, yet we cannot call on external principles to 
resolve our dilemmas in a final way. The fact that some form of ethics is unavoidable 
seems to be a very important insight from complexity theory. This follows as well from 
evolutionary-cybernetic reasoning (Heylighen, 2000; Turchin, 1990) as from the classic 
multi-agent simulations of the emergence of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). This 
resonates strongly with post-structural and Derridean ethics (see Cilliers, 1998: 136–
140, Cilliers 2004) 
 
Complexity and Relativism 
If complexity theory ultimately argues for the incompleteness of knowledge, it becomes 
a target, just like postmodernism, for those accusing it of relativism. This is not a 
meaningful accusation and has led to a lot of fruitless debates (cf. Sokal’s hoax). The 
dismissal of positions which try to be conscious of their own limitations is often a 
macho, if not arrogant move, one which is exactly insensitive to the ethical dimension 
involved when we deal with complexity. Modest positions do not have to be weak ones 
(see Norris, 1997; Cilliers, 2005). The development of a theoretical position which 
moves beyond the dichotomy of relativism and foundationalism (two sides of the same 
coin) is vital (cf. Heylighen, 2000). 
 The intersection between complexity and postmodern philosophy could lead to 
both exciting and very useful research. One of the rewards of this approach is that it 
allows insights from both the natural and the social sciences without one having to 
trump the other. 
 
Some Current Trends 
The contributions to the session on Philosophy and Complexity at the Complexity, 
Science, and Society conference (University of Liverpool, 2005), that was organized by 
one of us (Gershenson), and that we all participated in, provided a sample of current 
trends in the field. It was clear that concepts from complexity have not gone very 
deeply into philosophy, but the process is underway, since there are many open 
questions posed by scientific advances related to complexity, affecting especially 
epistemology and ethics. For example, research in life sciences demands a revaluation 
of our concept of 'life', while studies in cognitive sciences question our models of 'mind' 
and 'consciousness'. 
 The terminology introduced by complexity has already propagated, but not always 
with the best results. For example, the concept of emergence is still not well 
understood, a situation fuelled by the ignorant abuse of the term, although it is slowly 
being demystified. 
 An important aspect of complex adaptive systems that is currently influencing 
philosophy is that of evolution. The dynamism introduced by cybernetics and 
postmodernism has not yet invaded all its possible niches, where remnants of 
reductionism or dualism remain. Philosophy no longer is satisfied by explaining why 
something is the way it is, but it needs to address the question of how it got to be that 
way. 
 
 
Conclusion 
For centuries, the world view underlying science has been Newtonian. The 
corresponding philosophy has been variously called reductionism, mechanicism or 
modernism. Ontologically, it reduces all phenomena to movements of independent, 
material particles governed by deterministic laws. Epistemologically, it holds the 
promise of complete, objective and certain knowledge of past and future. However, it 
ignores or even denies any idea of value, ethics, or creative processes, describing the 
universe as merely a complicated clockwork mechanism.  
 Over the past century, various scientific developments have challenged this 
simplistic picture, gradually replacing it by one that is complex at the core. First, 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, followed by the notion of 
chaos in non-linear dynamics, showed that the world is intrinsically unpredictable. 
Then, systems theory gave a scientific foundation to the ideas of holism and emergence. 
Cybernetics, in parallel with postmodern social science, showed that knowledge is 
intrinsically subjective. Together with the theories of self-organization and biological 
evolution, they moreover made us aware that regularity or organization is not given, but 
emerges dynamically out of a tangle of conflicting forces and random fluctuations, a 
process aptly summarized as “order out of chaos” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).  
 These different approaches are now starting to become integrated under the 
heading of “complexity science”. Its central paradigm is the multi-agent system: a 
collection of autonomous components whose local interactions give rise to a global 
order. Agents are intrinsically subjective and uncertain about the consequences of their 
actions, yet they generally manage to self-organize into an emergent, adaptive system. 
Thus, uncertainty and subjectivity should no longer be viewed negatively, as the loss of 
the absolute order of mechanicism, but positively, as factors of creativity, adaptation 
and evolution. 
 Although a number of (mostly postmodern) philosophers have expressed similar 
sentiments, the complexity paradigm still needs to be assimilated by academic 
philosophy. This may not only help philosophy solve some of its perennial problems, 
but help complexity scientists become more aware of the foundations and implications 
of their models. 
  
 
References 
Ansell-Pearson, K. 1999. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. London: Routledge. 
Ashby W. R. An Introduction to Cybernetics, Methuen, London, 1964 
Axelrod, R. M. 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.  
Bahm, AJ: (1987) "Systems Profile: General Systems as Philosophy", Systems Research, v. 4:3, pp.203-
209. 
Bunge M (1979) Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 4. Ontology II A World of Systems. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: D. Reidel. 
Byrne, D. 1998. Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences. An Introduction. London: Routledge. 
Campbell, D. T. 1974 "Downward Causation" in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems. Studies 
in the Philosophy of Biology, F.J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds), Macmillan, New York, .  
Cilliers, P. 1998. Complexity and Postmodernism. Understanding complex systems. London: Routledge. 
Cilliers, P. 2001. Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex Systems. International Journal of 
Innovation Management, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 135–147. 
Cilliers, P. 2004. Complexity, Ethics and Justice. Journal for Humanistics (Tijdschrift voor 
Humanistiek), Vol. 5, nr. 19, p. 19–26 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP). 
Cilliers, P. 2005. Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism. Theory Culture &Society, Vol. 22 (5), pp 
255–267. 
Cilliers, P. and De Villiers, T. 2000. The Complex “I”, in The Political subject, edited by W. Wheeler, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 226–245. 
Cornell, D. 1992. The Philosophy of the Limit. London: Routledge. 
de Rosnay J. (1979). The macroscope: a new world scientific system, HarperCollins 
DeLanda, M. 2005. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. New York: Continuum. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus (trans. and edited by Brian Massumi) 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Derrida, J. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston: North-Western University Press. 
Freud, S. 1950 (1895). Project for a Scientific Psychology. Standard Edition, Vol. 1, pp. 281–397. 
London: The Hogarth Press. 
Gershenson, C. and F. Heylighen (2005). How can we think the complex? in: Richardson, Kurt (ed.) 
Managing the Complex Vol. 1: Philosophy, Theory and Application.(Institute for the Study of 
Coherence and Emergence/Information Age Publishing), p.47-62 
Guattari, F. 1995. Chaosmosis (trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis). Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Haken, H. Synergetics, Springer, Berlin, 1978. 
Held, D. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas. London: Hutchinson. 
Heylighen F. & Joslyn C. (2001): "Cybernetics and Second Order Cybernetics", in: R.A. Meyers (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology (3rd ed.), Vol. 4 , (Academic Press, New York), p. 
155-170. 
Heylighen F. (1989): "Causality as Distinction Conservation: a theory of predictability, reversibility and 
time order", Cybernetics and Systems 20, p. 361-384. 
Heylighen F. (1990): "Classical and Non-classical Representations in Physics I", Cybernetics and 
Systems 21, p. 423-444. 
Heylighen F. (1997): "Publications on Complex, Evolving Systems: a citation-based survey”, 
Complexity 2 (5), p. 31-36. 
Heylighen F. (2000): "Foundations and Methodology for an Evolutionary World View: a review of the 
Principia Cybernetica Project", Foundations of Science, 5, p. 457-490. 
Heylighen F. (2002): “The Science of Self-organization and Adaptivity”, in: L. D. Kiel, (ed.) 
Knowledge Management, Organizational Intelligence and Learning, and Complexity, in: The 
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems ((EOLSS), (Eolss Publishers, Oxford). (http://www.eolss.net)  
Holland J.H. 1996 Hidden Order: How adaptation builds complexity, Addison-Wesley. 
Kauffman S. A. 1995, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and 
Complexity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Langton C. G. 1990, Computation at the edge of chaos: phase transitions and emergent computation, 
Physica D, 42, 1-3, pp. 12-37.  
Luhmann, N. (1995) Social Systems, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lyotard, J. 1988. The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press. 
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J.1992, The tree of knowledge: The Biological Roots of Understanding, 
(rev. ed.), Shambhala, Boston.  
Medd W. "What Is Complexity Science?", Emergence, 2001, Vol. 3, Issue 1, p43 
Morin, E. (1992), Method. The nature of nature. New York: Peter Lang. 
Morin, E. (1992). The concept of system and the paradigm of complexity. In M. Maruyama (Ed.), 
Context and Complexity. Cultivating contextual understanding. (pp.125-136) New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
Norris, C. 1997. Against Relativism. Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Parsons T. (1991) The social system, Routledge, London 
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. 1984 . Order out of Chaos, Bantam Books, New York,  
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. 1997 The end of certainty: time, chaos and the new laws of nature - New 
York: Free Press 
Rasch, W. and Wolfe, C. (eds). 2000. Observing Complexity. Systems Theory and Postmodernity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Rescher, N. 1998. Complexity: a philosophical overview. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions. 
Richardson, K. (ed.) 2005. Managing the Complex Vol. 1: Philosophy, Theory and Application. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. 
Saussure, F. de. 1974. Course in General Linguistics. London: Fontana. 
Smuts, Jan C.1926 : Holism and Evolution, MacMillan, 
Stacey, R. 2001. Complex Responsive Processes in Organisations: Learning and Knowledge Creation. 
London: Routledge 
Stacey, R., Griffin, D. & Shaw, P. 2000. Complexity and Management: Fad or Radical Challenge to 
Systems Thinking? London: Routledge  
Taylor, M. C. 2003. The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Turchin V. (1990): "Cybernetics and Philosophy", in: The Cybernetics of Complex Systems, F. Geyer 
(ed.), (Intersystems, Salinas, California), p. 61-74. 
Urry, J. 2003. Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
von Bertalanffy, L. 1973, General System Theory (Revised Edition), George Braziller, New York.  
von Foerster, H., 1979 Cybernetics of Cybernetics, ed. K. Krippendorf, Gordon and Breach, New York  
Waldrop, M. M. (1992) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, London: 
Viking. 
